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Abstract.   
Objective:    To  estimate  welfare  maximising  tax  rates  for  beer,  wine,  and  spirits  using  a 
mathematical  model  that  considers  both  the  welfare  loss  alcohol  taxes  impose  on  non-abusive 
consumers and the welfare gains due to alcohol taxes reducing externality costs.      
Results:  Optimal per litre of pure alcohol (LAL) tax rates are substantially different to both current 
alcohol tax rates and the uniform tax rate recommended as part of the 2010 Australian Government 
Tax Review.  Given an individual consumer utility decision model, the best estimate values of the 
welfare maximising LAL tax rates are: $37 for beer, $11 for wine, $50 for spirits, and $77 for 
ready-to-drink spirits. 
Conclusion:    As  externality  costs  and  the  responsiveness  of  consumers  to  price  changes  are 
different for each alcohol type, community welfare is maximised by setting beverage specific LAL 
tax rates.         
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Introduction 
Externality  costs,  incomplete  information  about  costs,  and  self-control  issues  are  all  potential 
grounds for government intervention in the alcohol market [1].  National governments have a wide 
variety of intervention options, but one almost universal policy choice has been to levy alcohol 
specific taxes [2].  Unfortunately, Australia’s current alcohol excise tax regime has been poorly 
designed and is in need of reform [3].   
Figure 1 provides details on Australian excise tax rates in a common format; namely tax 
per litre of pure alcohol (LAL).  For beer there are six different excise tax rates -- three different 
excise tax classes × two packaging formats, and for spirits there are two different excise tax rates.  
Wine is taxed on the basis of price not alcohol content, and so for wine three representative cases 
are shown.  To put Australian excise tax rates in perspective, Table 1 provides information on the 
LAL excise tax rate for beer, wine, and spirits in 29 countries, and the ten largest American states.  
Notable features of the information in Figure 1 are that: low alcohol beer is lightly taxed; draught 
beer is taxed more lightly than packaged beer of equivalent alcohol strength; spirits are heavily 
taxed; cheap wine is lightly taxed; and expensive wine is heavily taxed.  Notable features of the 
information shown in Table 1 are that: countries with a substantial wine industry generally have no 
wine excise tax or a very low wine tax; spirits are heavily taxed; and current alcohol tax rates in 
Australia are relatively high. 
Figure 1  Effective alcohol excise tax rates for beer, wine and spirits 
 
Note:  Excise rates are for August 2010, and actual rates are indexed in February and August each year. Beer 
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rates have an adjustment for the impact of the WET producer rebate that exempts the first $500,000 in wholesale 
sales from tax. 
Source: Beer and spirits excise tax www.ato.gov.au wine values based on industry reports. 
Table 1  Alcohol excise taxes per litre of ethanol in 2010 Australian dollars  
Country  Beer  Wine  Spirits    Country  Beer  Wine  Spirits 
  LAL $  LAL $  LAL $      LAL $  LAL $  LAL $ 
Australia
a  32.17  14.90  71.67    Luxembourg  2.93  0.00  15.41 
Austria  7.40  0.00  14.80    Malta  2.77  0.00  20.72 
Belgium  6.33  5.51  25.93    Michigan
b  7.95  1.18  1.21 
Bulgaria  2.84  0.00  8.32    North Carolina
b  9.76  5.39  6.05 
California   2.40  0.46  1.21    Netherlands  10.06  8.25  22.26 
Canada  5.85  5.18  12.37    New York   4.69  0.69  0.85 
Cyprus  1.47  0.00  8.85    Ohio
b  6.59  0.74  1.09 
Czech republic  4.66  0.00  16.59    Pennsylvania
b c   4.77  na  0.49 
Denmark  10.12  9.65  29.81    Poland  6.81  4.35  17.29 
Estonia  8.03  8.55  20.99    Portugal  5.33  0.00  14.94 
Finland  38.47  33.10  58.30    Romania  2.77  0.00  11.10 
Florida   4.74  5.18  2.91    Slovakia  6.10  0.00  15.98 
France  4.01  0.40  22.39    Slovenia  14.80  0.00  14.80 
Georgia
b   2.76  3.48  6.13    Spain  3.37  0.00  12.29 
Germany  2.91  0.00  19.28    Sweden  24.10  24.78  72.82 
Greece  9.62  0.00  36.25    Texas   1.75  0.47  1.21 
Hungary  8.66  0.00  15.12    United Kingdom  28.13  28.90  38.66 
Illinois   6.23  3.20  1.40     
  Ireland  23.25  44.51  46.06    Average  8.76  5.87  18.84 
Italy  8.69  0.00  11.84    St deviation  8.67  10.31  17.91 
Latvia  4.56  7.43  18.59    Min  1.47  0.00  0.49 
Lithuania  3.64  6.71  18.93    Max  38.47  44.51  72.82 
Note: Beer conversions made for alcohol content of 4.8 percent by volume, and wine conversions made for average alcohol content of 
12.65 percent.  Conversions to Australian dollars are based on ten year average exchange rates to October 2010.   
        
a  Wine calculation based on average price of wine sold in Australia.  
        
b  State government controls all spirit sales and the implied excise tax rate is calculated using the Distilled Spirits Council of the 
United States methodology.    
        
c  All wine sales are through state-run stores.    
Source:  European Commission Excise Duty Tables July 2010; Canada www.cra-arc.gc.ca; and US www.taxfoundation.org   
Attempts  to  estimate  optimal  alcohol  taxes  for  Australia  in  the  1980s  suffered  from 
significant data uncertainty, but were nevertheless able to show that moving to a regime where tax 
rates are set based on externality cost information could generate an overall welfare gain [4].  The 
following discussion further develops a methodology for calculating alcohol taxes noted in the 2010 
Australian Government tax review as appropriate, but not used, and then calculates optimal alcohol 
taxes rates for beer, wine, spirits, and ready-to-drink spirits (RTDs) under different assumptions.     
Method 
The model [5] [6] assumes there are three types of alcohol consumer: moderate drinkers, informed 
abusers,  and  uninformed  abusers.    Consumption  by  moderate  drinkers  results  in  no  externality   5 
costs, but consumption by abusers does.  The difference between informed abusers and uninformed 
abusers is that informed abusers recognise the full range of private costs associated with abusive 
consumption, whereas uninformed abusers do not.  The uninformed abuser group would include 
young and underage drinkers.  The model also assumes that: (i) the alcoholic beverage industry is a 
competitive industry where price equals long run marginal cost and any tax change is fully passed 
through to the consumer;
1 (ii) alcohol tax revenue is cycled back to consumers; and (iii) due to the 
small budget  share  for  each beverage type the  income  compensated demand curve and the 
uncompensated demand curve are approximately equal.   
Abstracting from the issue of different beverage types to illustrate, t he problem faced by 
the policy maker trying to set the optimal  alcohol tax can be understood by considering Figure 2.  
Prior to the introduction of the tax moderate drinkers consume at  the point    
   and impose no 
externality costs on society.  Informed abusers take complete account of the negative impacts of 
excessive alcohol consumption on themselves, and prior to the introduction of the tax consume at 
the  point    
 .    The  dollar  value  of  the  marginal  externality  cost  imposed  on  society  with 
consumption of   
  is equal to the vertical distance fh.  Uninformed abusers fail to recognise some 
of the private costs of excessive alcohol consumption and so consume more than informed abusers.  
Specifically, prior to the tax uninformed abusers consume at the point   
 , and at this point the 
marginal benefit to the individual consumer is less than the marginal cost by the distance nj, with 
the marginal externality cost imposed on society equal to the distance jl.   
                                                        
1 If it is made clear at the outset that the desired policy outcome is to raise prices by a fixed amount and that if prices do 
not increase by this amount the tax rate will be increased further, there is little reason to think that 100 percent of the 
tax will not be passed through to consumers.   6 
Figure 2  Optimal alcohol taxation welfare losses and gains 
 
Note:  Figure draws on [5] [6]. 
  Following the introduction of the tax consumption by moderate consumers falls to   
  , 
consumption by informed abusers falls to   
 , and consumption by uninformed abusers falls to   
 .  
The welfare implications of these changes are as follows: moderate consumers suffer a welfare loss 
equal to the area abc; informed abusers suffer a welfare loss equal to the area def, but society gains 
the area efgh due to lower externality costs; uninformed abusers enjoy a welfare gain equal to the 
area  ijmn,  and  society  gains  the  area  ijkl  from  the  reduction  in  externality  costs.    A  formal 
mathematical representation of Figure 2, along with the implied optimal tax formula is given in the 
appendix.  
With the basic framework established, it is now possible to return to the issue of beverage 
specific taxes.  There is strong evidence that externality costs vary with beverage type [8-13], and 
that the own-price elasticity of demand is different across beer, wine, and spirits [14].  This means 
the optimal tax will be different for each beverage type.  The task of calculating optimal beverage 
specific taxes is however simplified as there is evidence that at an aggregate level cross beverage 
substitution impacts can be ignored [15].  
The information required to calculate the optimal tax for each beverage type is the pre-tax 
price; the average alcohol content;  the average externality cost for abusive consumption in the 
relevant  range;  the  average  uninternalised  private  cost  for  uninformed  abusers;  the  own-price 
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elasticity of demand for moderate drinkers, informed abusers, and uninformed abusers; and the 
consumption  share  for  moderate  consumers,  informed  abusers,  and  uninformed  abusers.  
Additionally, for spirits and RTDs cross-price elasticity values are required.  The best estimate 
values for each of the above parameters are shown in Table 2.   
Details of how the values in Table 2 were calculated are contained in the supplementary 
material, but the pre-tax price information has been derived from unpublished industry data; the 
elasticity information is taken from economic studies [14] [16]; the externality cost estimates are 
from a comprehensive study on the social costs of alcohol and drug use [7], with beverage specific 
cost shares informed by analysis of Australian National Drug Strategy Household Survey data [11] 
and other relevant information; the specific cost items included as externality costs are consistent 
with those considered in a recent alcohol tax paper [17]; the alcohol content calculations are based 
on  industry  data,  but  are  consistent  with  the  values  reported  in  a  recently  revised  alcohol 
consumption series [18], and the uninternalised private cost was inferred from available demand 
information.      8 
Table 2  Model parameter values used to calculate optimal Australian alcohol taxes  
Model parameters  Beer  Wine  RTDs  Spirits 
Key beverage details         
  Average pre-tax price $ LAL  99  76  78  46 
  Consumption LAL (M litres)  73.9  65.0  18.1  17.1 
  Average alcohol content (%)  4.24  12.65  5.15  36.27 
Consumption shares         
  Moderate consumption share of total consumption (%)
a  56  72  43  52 
  Informed abuser share of total consumption (%)  35  25  40  35 
  Uninformed abuser share of total consumption (%)
b  9  3  17  13 
Price elasticity values           
  Overall beverage price elasticity   -.37  -.40  -.67  -.96 
  Best estimate consumer type price elasticities          
     Moderate consumers   -.50  -.47  -1.00  -1.33 
     Informed and uninformed abusive consumers  -.21  -.19  -.41  -.55 
  Low variation in consumer type price elasticities          
     Moderate consumers  -.46  -.45  -.87  -1.20 
     Informed and uninformed abusive consumers  -.27  -.26  -.51  -.70 
  High variation in consumer type price elasticities         
     Moderate consumers   -.55  -.50  -1.13  -1.46 
     Informed and uninformed abusive consumers  -.15  -.13  -.31  -.40 
  Spirits-RTDs cross-price elasticity values
c           
     Moderate consumers   -  -  .29  .33 
     Informed abusive consumers  -  -  .08  .07 
     Uninformed abusive consumers  -  -  .08  .06 
Externality costs         
  Family utility model         
     Externality cost informed abusers $ per LAL  71  43  80  89 
     Externality cost uninformed abusers $ per LAL  78  47  88  98 
  Individual utility model         
     Externality cost informed abusers $ per LAL  125  75  151  141 
     Externality cost uninformed abusers $ per LAL  137  82  166  155 
Uninternalised private costs         
  Uninformed abuser uninternalised private $ per LAL
d   66  56  41  40 
Note:  
a Total moderate consumption share set at 60 percent of total ethanol consumption. 
b Total uninformed abuser ethanol 
share  set  at  20  percent  of  total  abuser  ethanol  intake. 
c  The  value  in  the  RTD  column  gives  percentage  change  in  RTD 
consumption following a one percent change in the price of spirits, and the value in the spirits column gives the percentage 
change in spirit consumption following a one percent change in the price of RTDs.  
d These values depend in part on the assumed 
elasticity value, and the values shown are those consistent with the best estimate elasticity values.   
Results   
The first set of results in Table 3 are estimates of the optimal alcohol tax for each beverage where 
the decision unit is assumed to be the family so that any negative impacts felt by family members 
due to abusive consumption are not considered.  The second set of results in Table 3 are estimates 
of the optimal tax where the decision unit is assumed to be the individual so that the negative 
impacts on family members due to abusive alcohol consumption are considered.  For the purposes   9 
of discussion, the results based on considering the individual as the appropriate decision unit are 
used.   
For beer, the estimated optimal tax rate involves a small increase in the effective full 
strength packaged beer tax, and a 60 percent increase in the current effective full strength draught 
beer tax.  Excise tax is a relatively small part of the overall draught beer retail price, and as such, an 
increase in the draught beer tax rate of 60 percent implies a retail price increase of only six percent.  
The  beer  industry  is  therefore  unlikely  to  be  impacted  dramatically  by  the  change  in  taxation 
suggested by the optimal tax formula.    
As the current wine tax is based on price not alcohol content, the implications of applying 
an LAL tax rate of $11.22 are difficult to calculate, but several broad points can be made.  First, if 
the current tax revenue collected from wine was converted to an LAL equivalent the implied tax 
rate would be around $13-$14.  So, overall the total tax burden on the wine industry would fall.  
Second, the excise tax on wine retailing for less than around $10-11 per bottle would rise and the 
excise on wine retailing for more than around $10-11 per bottle would fall.  Third, the effective tax 
on cask wine would increase by almost 300 percent; implying an increase in retail price of around 
25 percent.  So, although the optimal wine tax is relatively low, shifting to a volumetric tax of 
$11.22 would have a noticeable impact on the relative price of different wine products.  
For spirit drinkers the results suggest the tax on RTDs should be increased slightly, and 
that the tax on bottled spirits should be reduced by around 30 percent.  The implied retail price 
increase for RTDs would be around 4-5 percent, while the implied retail price fall for bottled spirits 
would be  around 17  percent.  The model accounts  for substitution between bottled spirits  and 
RTDs.  If cross beverage substitution effects within the spirits market were ignored, the implied 
optimal LAL tax rates would be lower.  Specifically, for the individual utility model the optimal tax 
rates would be $66 for RTDs and $47 for spirits.     10 
  All parameter values were varied within what where thought reasonable ranges, and the 
key model assumption was found to be the assumption about the relative price responsiveness of 
abusive and moderate consumers.  If abusers are assumed to be more insensitive to price changes 
than in the default case optimal taxes fall by around 30 percent (lower bound estimates in Table 3).  
If abusers are assumed to be more sensitive to price changes than in the default case optimal taxes 
increase by around one third (upper bound estimates in Table 3).   
Table 3  Optimal Australian alcohol taxes  
Beverage Category 













Wine tax $ per LAL  9.13  4.96  8.85    11.26  8.07  14.85 
Beer tax $ per LAL  29.81  17.07  28.23    36.95  27.46  46.99 
RTDs tax $ per LAL  47.36  32.15  65.31    76.79  52.35  104.60 
Spirits tax $ per LAL  29.82  19.04  41.78    49.80  32.19  68.92 
Discussion 
The analysis presented here has shown that the alcohol tax rates that maximise overall community 
welfare -- in that they balance the costs imposed on moderate drinkers against the gains made from 
lowering externality cost -- vary substantially with beverage type, and so the default position taken 
in the 2010 Australian Government tax review of a uniform LAL tax rate equal to the current 
packaged beer tax rate will not maximise overall community welfare.   
In addition to raising overall community welfare, using the approach outlined here to set 
alcohol taxes has a number of additional benefits, the most important of which is that the approach 
aligns the interests of alcoholic beverage manufactures with those of the broader community.  The 
alignment of interests occurs because with alcohol taxes set based on the formulas given in the 
appendix, the optimal alcohol tax falls if either the share of abusive consumption falls or the share 
of uniformed consumers falls.  In the specific case of wine, moving to a volumetric tax of $11.22 
would have the additional effect of raising the minimum standard drink price in Australia by around 
25 percent.        11 
Appendix 
The situation described by Figure 2 in the main text can be formally developed as a model for 
calculating the optimal  alcohol tax as  follows.    First,  note that  for the purposes  of  calculating 
optimal taxes the markets for beer, wine, and spirits can be treated separately.  This means that for 
beer  and  wine  the  change  in  welfare  following  the  introduction  of  the  tax  can  be  written, 
respectively, as: 
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For the spirits market it is necessary to consider the interaction between bottled spirits consumption 
and RTD consumption, and so the change in welfare following the introduction of a tax can be 
written as: 
   
 
       
    
   
 
       
    
      
     
    
      
     
    
      
     
    
   
 
 
       
    
   
 
       
    
      
     
    
      
     
    
      
     






In the above    denotes the tax for beverage type i (i = beer, wine, spirits, RTDs);    
  denotes the 
change in consumption of consumers of type j (j = moderate, informed abuser, uninformed abusers) 
in beverage category i;    
  denotes the number of consumers of type  j of beverage type i;   
  
denotes  the  marginal  externality  cost  associated  with  consumers  of  type  j  of  beverage  type  i 
averaged  over  the  relevant  range  of  consumption;  and    
   denotes  the  marginal  uninternalised 
private cost for consumer type j of beverage type i, averaged over the relevant range.  With this 
notation it can be seen that in equations (1) and (2) the first term captures the fall in welfare of 
moderate consumers following the introduction of the tax, and the second term captures the fall in   12 
welfare of informed abusers.   The third and  fourth terms  capture the gain  to  society  from  the 
reduction in externality costs associated with the reduced consumption of informed abusers and 
uninformed abusers, respectively, and the final term captures the private benefits to uninformed 
abusers  following  a  reduction  in  their  consumption.    For  the  spirits  market  it  is  necessary  to 
consider both what happens to RTD consumption and what happens to bottled spirit consumption, 
so equation (3) has double the terms of equation (1) and (2).  
Now, let   
   
      
 , so that   
  denotes the total amount of consumption associated with 
consumer type j for beverage i.  The price elasticity is defined as    
   
   
    
   
         , and gives the ratio 
of the percentage change in the consumption of beverage type i in consumer category j divided by 
the percentage change in the price of beverage k, where          and here price refers to the pre-
tax price.  Given each market is treated separately, and using the above relationships, it is possible 
to write the total change in consumption for beer, wine, bottled spirits, and RTDs following the 
introduction  of  a  tax,  as,  respectively:     
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 , and these relationships can then be 
substituted into equations (1), (2), and (3). 
Following these substitutions the optimal beer and wine taxes are found by differentiating 
equations (1) and (2) to find 
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, which are then set to zero and solved for    and   . 
Following simplification this process gives: 
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where the optimal LAL tax rate can then be calculated by multiplying the ad valorem rate by price 
and dividing by average alcohol content [5] [6]. 
For the spirits market the optimal spirits and RTD tax rates are found as follows.  First, 
equation (3) is differentiated to find 
  
   
 and 
  
   
.  These equations are then set to zero and expressed 
in terms of    and   .  This in turn results in a system of two equations with two unknowns that can 
be solved simultaneously [19].  Although the demand symmetry restriction can be used to achieve a 
degree  of  simplification,  the  optimal  tax  expressions  for  spirits  and  RTDs  remain  relatively 
complex.    As  such,  the  approach  taken  was  to  use  Mathematica  to  solve  the  expressions  and 
calculate the optimal tax rates.   
     14 
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Supplementary information 
The  following  information  explains  how  the  key  values  in  Table  2  of  the  main  paper  were 
determined.   
Key  beverage  parameters.  The  average  pre-tax  price,  consumption,  and  alcohol  content 
information were taken from a detailed database constructed from unpublished industry reports, 
WFA-Deloitte wine industry surveys, and ABS data [1].  Summary information on the nature of the 
database is shown in Table A1, and the way the average pre-tax and retail prices were calculated 
can be understood as follows.  If     and      are used to denote, respectively, the retail and pre-tax 
price for consumption category c, within beverage type j, and     is used to denote the associated 
quantity of consumption, then                   and                     denote, respectively, total 
retail expenditure and total tax free expenditure on beverage type j.  If     denotes the alcohol 
content of consumption category c within beverage type j, then                 denotes total ethanol 
consumption for beverage type j, and     /         denotes the average per litre of pure alcohol 
(LAL) retail price for beverage j, and      /           denotes the average LAL pre-tax price for 
beverage j.   17 





price     Alcohol      Volume 






4 and 5 litre casks  3.14  2.36    12.65    129,776 
2 litre casks  6.24  4.80    12.65    55,618 
Less than $7/bottle  6.65  5.15    12.65    65,292 
$7-$15 bottle  12.65  9.90    12.65    113,218 
$15-$20 bottle  21.92  17.46    12.65    68,557 
$20-$30 bottle  31.31  25.53    12.65    23,893 
More than $30 bottle  52.98  40.48     12.65     7,132 






Light packaged beer  3.32  2.46    2.68    142,647 
Mid packaged beer  3.63  2.32    3.48    231,681 
Regular packaged beer  4.54  2.69    4.56    871,179 
Premium packaged beer  7.08  4.72    5.20    105,479 
Light keg beer  8.79  7.88    2.68    39,099 
Mid keg beer  9.50  8.11    3.48    48,085 
Regular keg beer  11.05  9.03    4.56    274,915 
Premium keg beer  17.94  15.10     5.20     29,194 








  Spirits  46.13  16.70    36.27    47,161 
RTD Light  9.06  4.40    5.51    102,395 
RTD Dark  8.09  3.88     5.00     249,425 
 
Consumption ratio.  Earlier studies of US alcohol demand used approximately 40 percent of total 
consumption as the abusive consumption share [2] [3].  The range of values suggested for Australia 
is between 30 percent and 50 percent [4].  As such, the total ethanol share attributed to abusive 
consumption  was  set  at  40  percent.    Information  on  occasional  and  heavy  binge  drinking  that 
showed binge drinking to be most commonly associated with RTDs, followed by spirits, then beer, 
and lastly wine [5] was then used to adjust the shares in each beverage category with the global 
constraint that the share of total ethanol consumption attributable to abusive consumption was 40 
percent.  Formally, let    denote total ethanol consumption for beverage type j (j = beer, wine, 
spirits, RTDs) so that            denotes total ethanol consumption.  Let   , where 0 <    < 1, 
denote the share of abusive ethanol consumption associated with beverage type j so that            
denotes total abusive ethanol consumption for beverage type j,               and   /       .  The 
specific values used for    were: .44 for beer, .28 for wine, .48 for spirits, and .57 for RTDs.   18 
The share of total uninformed consumption out of total abusive consumption was set at 20 
percent  so  that  the  total  ethanol  shares  across  moderate  consumers,  informed  abusers,  and 
uninformed abusers are 60 percent, 32 percent, and 8 percent.  Based on the idea that it will be the 
young  that  are  overrepresented  in  the  uninformed  consumer  category,  the  beverage  specific 
uninformed consumer share was then adjusted to reflect information on the underage participation 
rate by beverage type that showed underage participation to be highest for RTDs, followed by 
spirits, then beer, and finally wine [5].  Formally, let   , where 0 <    < 1, denote the share of 
uninformed  abusive  consumption  out  of  total  abusive  ethanol  consumption  associated  with 
beverage  type  j  so  that                 denotes  total  uninformed  abusive  ethanol  consumption  for 
beverage type j,                  denotes total uninformed abusive consumption, and    /        .  The 
specific values used for    were: .20 for beer, .11 for wine, .27 for spirits, and .29 for RTDs. 
Elasticity values.  The overall own-price elasticity estimates for beer, wine, and spirits represent 
the average of the unconditional compensated price elasticity values reported for Australia in a 
recent meta-analysis of alcohol demand [6].  Information on the own-price elasticity of demand for 
RTDs was not available and the value used is the average of the spirits and beer own-price elasticity 
values.  To determine the moderate and abuser price elasticity values additional information on the 
ratio of the own-price elasticity of demand for the median drinker, -1.19, standard error .25, to that 
of a heavy drinker, -.49 standard error .26, where a heavy drinker is classified as a drinker at the 
90
th percentile of consumption was used [7].  Specifically, the own-price elasticity values used are 
the values consistent with the elasticity ratio of -1.19/-.49 = 2.4 that satisfy the additional constraint 
that the consumption share weighted own-price elasticity values equal the overall beverage specific 
own-price elasticity.  For example, in the case of wine, the overall own-price elasticity estimate is -
.40,  the  abusive  share  of  consumption  estimate  is  28  percent,  and  the  non-abusive  share  of 
consumption estimate is 72 percent.  As (-.19 × .28) + (-.47 × .72) = -.40, and -.47/-.19 = 2.4, for 
wine, the abusive elasticity estimate is -.19 and the non-abusive elasticity estimate is -.47.  For the   19 
low  variation  in  consumer  type  scenario  an  elasticity  ratio  of  1.7  was  used,  and  for  the  high 
variation in consumer type scenario an elasticity ratio of 3.6 was used.  These two elasticity ratios 
represent, respectively, the case where the above cited median and heavy drinker price elasticity 
estimates are each one half a standard error closer together, and each one half a standard error 
further apart.   
Cross-price  effects.  In  setting  the  cross-price  elasticity  values  for  spirits  and  RTDs  the 
requirement that the conditional budget share weighted cross-price elasticity values are equal was 
imposed for each consumer type.  To establish a reference cross-price effect, for each consumer 
group the spirits-RTD cross-price effect was set at the spirits own-price elasticity multiplied by -.20. 
Externality costs.  Social cost data was obtained for the period 2004-05 [4] and these values were 
then converted to current dollar values using the CPI.  The range of costs considered in the analysis 
varies depending on whether an individual utility model is used or a family utility model is used [8].  
The specific allocation of costs for the family utility model and the individual utility model largely 
follow an existing allocation structure [8] and can be understood as follows.  For the case where the 
family is chosen as the appropriate decision unit: 100 percent of estimated crime costs are deemed 
an externality; 50 percent of estimated road trauma costs are deemed external to abusers; 80 percent 
of estimated additional health costs are assumed to be external to abusers; and lost tax revenue is 
calculated as 30 percent of estimated lost labour income.  For the case where the individual is 
chosen as the appropriate decision unit all of the costs associated with the family unit model are 
included, plus: 70 percent of lost disposable income, and 30 percent of the intangible cost of higher 
morbidity and mortality.  For each cost category the raw social cost estimate, and the share of costs 
deemed to be an externality for each model are shown in Table A2.   20 
Table A2  Translation of raw social cost estimates to externality costs 










Traffic costs  2,202  1,101  1,101 
Health costs  1,977  1,582  1,582 
Crime costs  1,424  1,424  1,424 
Lost tax revenue  1,061  1,061  1,061 
Loss disposable income to family  2,477  -  1,734 
Intangible costs of morbidity and mortality  4,489  -  1,347 
Total cost in 2004-05 dollars  13,630  5,168  8,248 
Total cost in current dollars  15,807  5,993  9,566 
Note:  Raw social cost data [4] Allocation methodology [8], specific share allocation for lost disposable income and 
intangible cost author estimates. 
 
The model requires an estimate of externality costs per LAL across abusive consumption 
for each beverage type.  Total abusive consumption was established as described above, and total 
externality  costs  allocated  are  as  per  Table  A2.    The  way  these  costs  were  allocated  across 
beverages can be understood as follows.  If    denotes the total externality cost associated with cost 
category i (i = health, crime, road trauma, lost tax revenue, lost disposable income, and intangible 
costs of morbidity and mortality), then             is the total alcohol related externality cost.  Let 
    denote the unadjusted externality cost weight for beverage type j applicable to externality cost 
category i, where                , and             .  With this notation       represents the externality 
cost  allocation  to  beverage  type  j  for  externality  cost  category  i  under  the  assumption  that 
externality costs do not vary across beverage types.  Let each     then be subjectively adjusted 
based on available information to reflect the extent to which externality cost type i varies across the 
j beverage types so that the adjusted weight       is greater than     if there is evidence beverage 
type  j  is  overrepresented  in  externality  cost  category  i,  and  less  than       if  there  is  evidence 
beverage type j is underrepresented in externality cost category i, with the overall constraint that the 
      must be positive and               .  Although the reweighting is subjective, it reflects a genuine 
attempt to incorporate available information on traffic costs [5] [9-10], health costs [5] [11-13], 
crime costs [5] [13-14], and labour productivity costs [5].   21 
  Total  externality  costs  for  each  beverage  were  then  allocated  across  informed  and 
uninformed  abusive  consumption  with  the  additional  assumption  that  externality  costs  are  10 
percent higher for uninformed abusers.  This assumption effectively gives a step-wise price plus 
externality cost curve so that Figure 2 in the main paper looks like Figure A1 below.  Evidence to 
support the adjustments made to the raw externality weights, along with the specific weights used 
are set out below.   
Figure A1  Optimal alcohol taxation welfare losses and gains 
 
 
Traffic costs details.  A study using data from Western Australia found: (i) no impact from 
wine  sales  at  licensed  premises  to  drink  driving  incidents;  (ii)  higher  spirit  sales  at  licensed 
premises were associated with more drunk driving but not accidents; and (iii) higher beer sales at 
licensed  premises  were  associated  with  more  accident  and  non-accident  drink  driving  [9].    A 
Canadian study found  a one litre increase in  beer  ethanol  consumption results  in  a 23 percent 
increase road fatalities, and no association for spirits and wine [10].  The same study also cites 
many similar findings for the over representation of beer in drink driving incidents.  Analysis of 
Australian National Drug Strategy Household Survey data also shows beer drinkers are most likely 
to have driven a car while under the influence of alcohol, followed by RTD drinkers, spirit drinkers, 
and  lastly  wine  drinkers  [5].    Combined  this  information  provides  the  basis  for  increasing  the 
weight for beer, slightly increasing the weight to RTDs, holding the weight to spirits constant, and 
decreasing the weight to wine.    
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Health costs details. Self-reported health status measures in the Australian National Drug 
Strategy Household Survey data suggests fair or poor health is most common for beer drinkers, 
followed by spirits drinkers, and then wine drinkers [5].  A meta analysis found evidence to support 
the idea that moderate wine consumption confers greater benefits than moderate beer consumption 
in relation to cardio vascular disease [12], where the working hypothesis regarding the additional 
protection of wine is that it is due to the phenolic acids and polyphenols contained in wine.  Support 
for this view can be found in evidence the benefits of wine consumption relative to other alcoholic 
beverages are greater in populations that do not have a diet high in fruit and vegetables which 
contain phenolic acids and polyphenols [11]  
The  relationship  between  alcohol  consumption  and  accident  mortality  in  14  European 
countries has also been investigated [13].  Countries were identified as either beer drinking (Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  Germany,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  and  the  UK),  wine  drinking  (France, 
Portugal, Italy, and Spain), or spirit drinking (Finland, Norway, and Sweden), and it was found that 
the impact of a one litre increase in pure alcohol consumption had the most pronounced impact on 
accident mortality in the spirit drinking countries, followed by the beer drinking countries, and then 
the wine drinking countries.  In Australia, risky behaviour such as swimming while drunk etc., is 
generally more common with RTD drinkers, followed by full strength beer drinkers, and finally 
wine drinkers [5].  Synthesising this information suggests that adjusted externality cost weights 
should not vary radically from their unadjusted weights, but that relative to the unadjusted weights 
the adjusted weight for wine should be reduced, the weight to beer left approximately unchanged, 
and the weight to spirits and RTDs increased.    
Crime cost details.  RTD drinkers are the most likely to admit they have damaged public 
property, created a public disturbance, or physically abused someone [5].  International evidence 
suggests that violent crime has a tendency to be associated with spirit consumption [14] and those 
likely to engage in the types of risky behaviour associated with property crime tend to consume beer   23 
[15].  With greater weight placed on Australian evidence over international evidence, it was thought 
appropriate to decrease the weight to wine, increase the weight to beer and spirits slightly, and 
increase the weight to RTDs.   
Lost tax revenue details.  Information on self-reported days absent from work or study due 
to alcohol consumption was used to adjusted the weights.  The available information indicated there 
was a substantial difference between wine and other beverages, and that the problem of missing 
work or study due to alcohol consumption was greatest with RTD consumption.  Specifically, the 
average days absent from work/study each year reported were: .066 for wine drinkers, .135 for beer 
drinkers, .163 for bottled spirits drinkers, and between .166 and .190 for RTD drinkers [5].  Based 
on this information the weight to wine was reduced, the weight to beer increased slightly, and the 
weight to spirits and RTDs increased.   
Lost income to family members.  The weights used for lost income to family members are 
equal to the weights used for lost tax revenue. 
Intangible costs of morbidity and mortality.  The weights used to allocate the intangible 
costs of morbidity and mortality are equal to the arithmetic mean of the weights for health and 
traffic costs. 
Table A3  Externality weights and per LAL externality costs by beverage type 
Externality cost details  Beer  Wine  RTDs  Spirits 
  Ave externality cost across abusive consumption: Family utility model $ per LAL  103  59  119  99 
  Ave externality cost across abusive consumption: Individual utility model $ per LAL  170  92  196  166 
  Unadjusted externality weight for each beverage  .47  .26  .15  .12 
  Adjusted externality weight – road trauma   .56  .18  .16  .12 
  Adjusted externality weight – health care  .48  .18  .15  .19 
  Adjusted externality weight – crime  .48  .13  .24  .15 
  Adjusted externality weight – lost tax revenue  .50  .15  .20  .15 
  Adjusted externality weight – lost income to family members  .50  .15  .20  .15 
  Adjusted externality weight – Intangible costs of morbidity and mortality  .52  .18  .17  .13 
   24 
Uninternalised  private  costs.  In  each  beverage  category  uninformed  abusers  are  assumed  to 
consume 12.5 percent more than informed abusers.  With this assumption the implied uninternalised 
private cost  was  calculated as  follows.   First,  beverage specific own-price elasticity values for 
abusive and non-abusive consumption were estimated as described above.  The abusive own-price 
elasticity estimate was then used to calculate the implied slope of a linear demand curve around the 
point of current estimated per capita abusive consumption using the estimated current average LAL 
retail  price.   It  can however be noted that given the fixed percentage assumption used for the 
difference between informed and uninformed abusive consumption, an accurate estimate of current 
per capita abusive consumption is not required.   
Given  the  slope  of  the  demand  curve  for  the  informed  abusive  consumer  and  the 
uninformed abusive consumer is the same, it is then possible to calculate the size of the vertical 
distance between the uninformed and informed abuser demand curves.  For example, assume the 
average informed wine abuser consumes 10 litres of pure alcohol from wine each year.  Given the 
assumption  made  about  uninformed  abusive  consumption  relative  to  informed  abusive 
consumption, uninformed abusers consume 11.25 litres of pure alcohol from wine per year.  The 
assumed abuser own-price elasticity is -.19, and the average LAL retail price for wine is $89.54.  
The slope of both the informed abuser and uninformed abuser demand curve is then 
  
    
 
   
 
   
 
      
     
           .  The difference in the assumed level of consumption multiplied by the slope 
of the demand curve 1.25   $57.16 = $64.59 then gives the vertical distance between the two 
demand curves, which is the raw estimate of the uninternalised private cost, and for beverage j this 
value is denoted    .  Given the number of assumptions used to calculate each uninternalised private 
cost estimate an adjustment was then made to draw each estimate closer to the mean uninternalised 
private cost estimate as follows.  Let 
 
      
 
         , so that the adjusted uninternalised cost estimate 
for beverage j, denoted     is found as                  , where the default value for   is .5.     25 
As the formula used to calculate the uninternalised private cost relies on the own-price 
elasticity  estimate,  for  the  scenarios  that  consider  abusers  as  either  more  responsive  or  less 
responsive the estimated uninternalised private cost was recalculated.  The specific uninternalised 
private cost values used for each scenario are shown in Table A4.  
Table A4  Uninternalised private cost estimates 
Externality cost details  Beer  Wine  RTDs  Spirits 
Best estimate values $ per LAL  66  56  41  40 
Abusers more responsive $ per LAL  56  45  37  34 
Abusers less responsive $ per LAL  101  84  59  52 
     26 
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